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Articles
AMERICA'S CIVIL JUSTICE DILEMMA: THE PROSPECTS
FOR REFORM
DICK THORNBURGH*
INTRODUCTION
Despite Judge Learned Hand's oft-quoted observation that "litiga-
tion is to be dreaded beyond almost anything short of sickness or
death," the United States has become the most litigious society on
earth.' Our society seems to seek a virtual risk-free environment and
when anything goes wrong, the first question commonly asked is
"whom do I sue?" Our courts are clogged. Litigation has become in-
creasingly complicated, expensive, and lengthy. Public dissatisfaction
with lawyers and our justice system is widespread. While we have not
quite reached the stage at which a Shakespearean call to "kill all the
lawyers"2 is forthcoming, the signs across our society are ominous.
Consider our civil justice system. Tort law in the United States
has created what amounts to a liability tax.3 This tax, deriving from
tort liability, is imposed on all providers of goods and services and is
part of the cost of almost everything we buy.4 It directly costs Ameri-
can individuals, businesses, and municipal governments $150 billion
* Counsel, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP, Washington, D.C. B.A., Yale University;
L.L.B., University of Pittsburgh; former Attorney General of the United States (1988-91).
The author wishes to acknowledge the substantial contribution to this Article of Elizabeth
H. Baird, a 1995 summer associate at Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP.
1. In 1989 nearly 18 million new civil suits were filed in American courts-one lawsuit
for every 10 adults. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM IN AMERICA (1991) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS].
There are 70,000 product liability suits pending annually in the United States, com-
pared with only 200 in the United Kingdom. KIRKLAND & ELLIS, THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF
PRODUCT LIABILITY ON U.S. COMPETITIVENESS: LIABILrIY LAW REFORM REINFORCED BY NEW
STUDIES 12 (Washington Legal Foundation, Critical Legal Issues: Working Paper Series
No. 43, Oct. 1990) (citing Gary T. Schwartz, Medical Malpractice and Products Liability: A
Comparative Legal Assessment 39-40 (1990) (Brookings Institution Symposium)).
The United States has 30 times more lawsuits per person than Japan. America's Legal
Mess, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 19, 1991, at 72.
2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH, act 4, sc. 2.
3. Peter W. Huber, Flypaper Contracts and the Genesis of Modern Tort, 10 CARDozo L. REV.
2263, 2263-65 (1989).
4. Part of the tort tax is also paid through the reduced availability of goods and serv-
ices. To Reform the Federal CivilJustice System, To Reform Product Liability Law: Hearing on H.R.
10 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1995) [hereinafter
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per year.5 The tax is collected through litigation.6 It represents as
much as thirty percent of the price of a stepladder,7 over ninety-five
percent of the cost of childhood vaccines," one-quarter of the price of
a ride on a Long Island tour bus,9 one-third the cost of a small air-
plane,"0 and actually exceeds the cost of making a football helmet. 1
Potential tort liability has temporarily closed the "Cyclone" at the Co-
ney Island Amusement Park, several public beaches, and a number of
ice-skating rinks.12 It has curtailed Little League games,1 3 fireworks
displays, evening concerts, and sailboard races. 4 It will soon cost
large municipal governments as much as they spend on sanitation or
fire services.1 5
The focus of this Article is on common-sense reform of our civil
justice system, an issue that has come to center stage both in Congress
and in many state legislatures. The public has expressed concern and
outrage over excessive verdicts such as the infamous $2.7 million ver-
dict against McDonald's for serving dangerously hot coffee,' 6 and the
$4 million punitive award tacked on to a $4000 verdict for an undis-
closed touch-up paintjob on an Alabama BMW.' 7 Ideals such as pro-
Hearing on H.R. 10] (statement of Patrick J. Head, Vice President and General Counsel,
FMC Corporation).
5. ROBERT W. STURGIS, TORT COST TRENDS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECIVE (1995).
6. Huber, supra note 3, at 2264.
7. PETER W. HUBER, LIABILT-Y: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3
(1989).
8. "[I]n 1982, the private sector cost of immunizations for a two-year-old was $20.17.
Ten years later ... the cost of a complete regimen of vaccinations has risen to $188.19, with
the federal liability tax constituting 12.5% of that price." The Vaccine Outlook, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 23, 1993, at A20 (editorial).
9. Huber, supra note 3, at 3 (citing Robert Hanley, Insurance Costs Imperil Recreation
Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1986, at Al).
10. Id. (citing General Aviation Tort Reform Considered, THE EXECUTVE LETrER, Ins. Info.
Inst., Aug. 18, 1986, at 1).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See generally U.S. Rep. John E. Porter, Volunteer Immunity: Prodding the States, in
STATE CRLJUSTICE REFORM, 63, 64 (Roger Clegg ed., 1994) (discussing a suit that eventu-
ally settled for $125,000 filed against volunteer Little League coaches after a player was
injured by a fly ball hit into the outfield).
14. Huber, supra note 3, at 4.
15. Id.
16. The total damages were later reduced to $640,000. Benjamin Weiser, Tort Reform's
Promise, Peril: Legislation Could Mean Tight Limits on Liability, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1995, at
Al. The punitive damages awarded represented $400,000 of the total. Id.
17. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1589
(1996). The punitive award was later cut in half by the state supreme court. Id. The
United States Supreme Court overturned the award as grossly excessive in violation of due
process. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1604.
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portionality and justice have been replaced by what amounts to a legal
lottery.
Many Americans appear to think that issues of civil justice reform
are only for the judges, the lawyers, and the academics. Ordinary citi-
zens find it difficult to relate controversy over legal principles and
concepts to their everyday lives. I want to suggest, however, that fun-
damental principles of this debate are found in three basic areas: en-
hancing our economic competitiveness and ensuring job security;
preserving our health care system and the viability of medical re-
search; and guaranteeing to all citizens their right to a day in court.
All of these interests are adversely affected by the present shortcom-
ings in our civil justice system.
This Article will lay out some specific areas where I think reform
in our civil justice system is necessary to protect these interests. Part I
targets the problems, including the burdens on American competi-
tiveness, the domestic health care system and litigants' rights. Part II
focuses on solutions.' 8
I. THE PROBLEMS
More than any other area of law, tort liability reflects society's
prevalent moral, technological, ideological, and economic condi-
tions. Because there are financial, cultural, and justice interests in
conflict, tort law is highly vulnerable and responsive to change."
First, the substantial financial interests of both business and trial law-
yers are placed at the fore the moment one begins to talk about re-
form of the legal system. Second, cultural issues are presented: our
quest for a risk-free society and the emergence of the so-called victim
syndrome. Finally, tort law must serve the underlying goal of the
search for justice under the rule of law-the redress of wrongs must
Another noteworthy case involves a Maine golfer who accidentally hit herself in the
face with her own golf ball. The ball ricocheted off railroad tracks on the golf course and
hit her in the nose. She collected $40,000. Hooking a Tort, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1995, at
A12 (editorial).
18. Most of these recommendations, not surprisingly, were framed and proposed by
the Bush Administration while I served as Attorney General in the Agenda for CivilJustice
Reform in America PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 1, passim. The
Council report stated the following goals for civil justice reform: (1) swifter justice; (2)
reduced costs of litigation; (3) greater choice in methods of resolving disputes; and (4)
maintaining the integrity of the justice system. The House of Representatives passed many
of these suggestions as part of the Republican "Contract with America," and some were
approved in the Senate as well. All are based on common sense and deserve serious con-
sideration. These goals will serve as a framework for Part II of this Article.
19. PETER H. SCHucK, TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 18 (1991).
20. See id.
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continue to be a priority for our society. The ultimate goal is to re-
solve these seemingly conflicting interests. I focus first on the three
specific problem areas mentioned and consider some ways in which
we might address them.
A. Enhancing Our Economic Competitiveness
First, let us examine the primary thesis of the report prepared for
the President's Council on Competitiveness.21 The defects in our civil
justice system have had a harmful effect on our economic competitive-
ness and, in turn, on our economic growth and our ability to create
and retainjobs.22 Litigation constitutes a hidden tax on the American
economy. It not only increases costs to American consumers, but it
impedes our international competitiveness.2" A good example of this
flaw in the tort system is product liability litigation.
1. Product Liability.-The civil justice system wreaks a self-in-
flicted competitive disadvantage on the American economy. Accord-
ing to a study by the Wharton School at the University of
Pennsylvania, product liability litigation was estimated to add $1.6 bil-
lion annually to the cost of doing business in Pennsylvania alone. 4 In
order to remain competitive, manufacturers need as much stability in
their costs as possible-including predictable liability costs, something
that is impossible under the current system.
The threat of liability coupled with the uncertainty of outcomes
hurts U.S. industry and, consequently, U.S. consumers and the entire
21. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 1, at 1-3.
22. Three prominent non-lawyers explore this theme in recent books about problems
in the American economy. See PETER PETERSON, FACING UP 182 (1993) (observing that
product liability is the area of the law that poses the greatest threat to American competi-
tiveness and overall economic prosperity); EDWARD LtrrTwAr, THE ENDANGERED AMERICAN
DREAM 217-18 (1993) (noting that demonstrating compliance with regulations may cost
more than actual compliance); MICHAEL PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS
649 (1990) ("[P]roduct liability is so extreme and uncertain as to retard innovation. The
legal and regulatory climate places firms in constant jeopardy of costly... product liability
suits. The existing approach goes beyond any reasonable need to protect consumers, as
other nations have demonstrated through more pragmatic approaches.").
23. See PETERSON, supra note 22, at 182.
24. PETER LINNEMAN & DANIEL INGBERMAN, PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW: THE ECONOMIC
IMPACT ON PENNSYLVANIA 8-9 (1989). The American public pays the ultimate price. As one
commentator asserted:
In each manufacturing industry subjected to sustained courtroom assault-pre-
scription drugs, vaccines, contraceptives, sporting equipment, small planes, small
cars, insulation materials-products that represent a valuable choice over some of
the remaining alternatives have either been driven off the market or not intro-
duced for fear of liability, with increasingly tragic results for the public health.
WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 6-7 (1991).
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economy. Consumers and businesses in this country spend $80 billion
annually on litigation and liability insurance premiums. 5 A 1984 U.S.
Department of Commerce study revealed that foreign competitors
often face product liability insurance costs twenty to fifty times lower
than those faced by U.S. companies. 6 The huge volume of litigation
has added sizable costs to consumer goods.2 7
2. Innovation.-The indirect costs are inestimable. One survey
of manufacturers and retail firms showed that forty-seven percent had
discontinued products, 28 twenty-five percent had discontinued or cur-
tailed research,29 fifteen percent had laid off workers as a direct result
of product liability experience,30 and eight percent had closed plants
based on actual or anticipated liability costs.3 The threat of liability
has significantly inhibited the product development and innovation 32
needed to provide improved services to consumers and to assure a
leadership role for our economy worldwide.33
B. Health Care
A brief look at our health care system illustrates the necessity for
reform. Here, the civil justice system plays a large role, specifically in
the field of medical malpractice. The purpose of a medical liability
system is to deter negligent practice.34 The goal of the system should
be to minimize the total social cost of medical injuries as defined by
25. HUBER, supra note 7, at 4.
26. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 1, at 3.
27. For example, an automotive liability of over $6 billion per year is meted out as a 5%
per car cost to American consumers. KIRKLAND & ELLIS, supra note 1, at 18 (citing Murray
Mackay, Liability, Safety and Innovation in the Automotive Industry (1990) (Brookings Institu-
tion Symposium)).
28. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 1, at 3; see also Alfred W.
Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, The Anti-Competitive Impact of U.S. Product Liability Laws:
Are Foreign Businesses Beating Us at Our Own Game?, 9J.L. & COM. 167, 199-201 app. A (listing
discontinued product lines).
29. See Cortese & Blaner, supra note 28, at 201-02 (listing examples).
30. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 1, at 3.
31. Id.; see also Cortese & Blaner, supra note 28, at 198 app. A (discussing WEPCO, Inc.,
a company that manufactured driving aids for the disabled, forced out of business because
it could not obtain product liability insurance, even though it had never been sued and was
certified by the Veteran's Administration).
32. For example, Monsanto did not market an already patented phosphate fiber asbes-
tos substitute because of the liability risk. Cortese & Blaner, supra note 28, at 201.
33. A nation's economic growth is determined by the rate of growth of labor and capi-
tal, and the rate of technological advances and productivity improvement. Robert E. Litan,
The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: Myths and Realities, in TORT LAW AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 19, at 127, 148-49.
34. Patricia M. Danzon, Malpractice Liability: Is the Grass on the Other Side Greener?, in
TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 19, at 176, 177.
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the actual costs of the injury, plus prevention and litigation." Instead,
it has raised insurance premiums and with them overall health care
costs, forced many doctors to curtail their practices, and fostered
more defensive medicine.3 6
1. Medical Malpractice.-In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
explosion of claims filed against physicians and the dramatic accelera-
tion in the size of awards and settlements led most insurance carriers
to curtail their medical liability coverage. 7 As it became too difficult
to predict future claims and to calculate the premiums required, com-
mercial carriers withdrew from the market." Disruption of medical
services became a real possibility in some states, as certain medical
services became unavailable, particularly in rural counties.3 9 Physi-
cians, working with state medical societies, began to form their own
medical liability insurance companies. These not-for-profit compa-
nies are now the major force in the medical malpractice insurance
market, and cover more than half of the self-insured physicians in this
country.40
As medical malpractice claims spiraled again in the 1980s, so too
did liability insurance premiums. 41 Some physicians were paying hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars a year for liability coverage. Annually,
the estimated cost of liability insurance for doctors and health care
facilities alone is over $9 billion.42 This crisis compelled many of
them to eliminate high-risk procedures and high-risk patients from
35. Id.
36. High health care costs spill over into other industries. The Chrysler Corporation
estimates that liability costs add $700 to the cost of each car to cover employee health care
costs. That is double what French and German automakers pay and triple what Japanese
producers must add. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, PRODUCT LIABILITY: EVOLUTION AND RE-
FORM (June 1989).
37. Martin J. Hatlie et al., Health Care Liability: Reform in a Changing Environmen4 in
STATE CIVIL JUSTICE REroRm, supra note 13, at 35, 44-45; see also Danzon, supra note 34, at
177.
38. Hatlie et al., supra note 37, at 45.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. During the period from 1975 to 1986, claim frequency per 100 physicians rose
at an average rate of at least 10% per year, with a particularly sharp increase from 13.5
claims per 100 in 1982 to 17.2 per 100 in 1986. Danzon, supra note 34, at 179. The average
amount paid per claim rose at twice the rate of the Consumer Price Index from 1975 to
1984. Id. From 1994 to 1995, there was a 40% increase in the median award in medical
malpractice cases. HenryJ. Reske, Tort Awards Increasing, 82 A.B.A J. 26, 26 (May 1996).
Over half of U.S. physicians now have at least $1 million in coverage. Danzon, supra note
34, at 180. More medical malpractice suits were filed in the decade ending in 1987 than in
the entire previous history of American tort law. HUBER, supra note 7, at 9.
42. Hadie et al., supra note 37, at 46.
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their practice.43 One result has been that in some states family physi-
cians refuse to practice obstetrics.4 4 Ultimately, the cost of these pre-
miums gets passed on to the patients; for example, in Florida, $1119
goes to pay for liability insurance for each baby delivered.45
2. Defensive Medicine.-Defensive medicine is the label given to
unnecessary or redundant medical procedures that are ordered out of
fear of a malpractice claim. These practices add further costs to our
health care bill. The unpredictability of both liability standards and
the size of damage awards has created an incentive for physicians to
overcompensate and contributes significantly to the rise in health care
costs. 4 6 Defensive medicine had an estimated cost of $25 billion in
the United States in 1991. 47 Seventy-eight percent of physicians con-
firm that the threat of liability leads them to order tests that they
would otherwise consider unnecessary.4" The specter of liability thus
creates an enormous obstacle to affordable health care.
3. Product Liability.-Product liability concerns have forced the
withdrawal of drugs and medical products from the market. The drug
Bendectin, a morning sickness remedy, was pulled from the market
because the annual $20 million in sales could not support the annual
$18 million cost of litigation and insurance. 49 The pertussis, or
whooping cough, vaccine was developed to prevent what had been the
leading crippler and killer of children before its introduction in the
1940s. By 1985, seven of the eight manufacturers of the drug with-
drew it from the market because of lawsuits. 50 A liability fund, fi-
nanced by the increased cost of the vaccine, was finally established to
prevent a shortage. 51 A similar climate of uncertainty has discouraged
research for an AIDS vaccine as many companies have delayed or
43. Danzon, supra note 34, at 194. A survey conducted in 1986, after the sharp pre-
mium increases of 1985, showed that about 20% of physicians reported that they had
dropped high-risk procedures as a response to liability. Id.
44. Hatlie et al., supra note 37, at 46.
45. Id. at 45.
46. Danzon, supra note 34, at 196.
47. Hatlie et al., supra note 37, at 46 (citing LEWIN-VHI, ESTIMATING THE COSTS OF DE-
FENSIVE MEDICINE (Jan. 27, 1993)).
48. Danzon, supra note 34, at 46.
49. W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship Between Product Lia-
bility and Innovation, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 19, at 105, 112. The
truly astounding fact is that a product liability recovery was never successfully obtained
from the manufacturer. Id.
50. Hatlie et al., supra note 37, at 47.
51. Id.
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abandoned clinical trials of promising substances because of fear of
liability.
52
C. Civil Justice-Litigants' Rights
The rights of the litigants also must be recognized. Two
problems-the time it takes to get a case to trial5" and the relatively
low percentage of the recovery that goes to the injured persons'-
must be resolved. Victims, as well as defendants, have an interest in
the predictability of compensation for their injuries. This element is
lacking under the current system. No one can give victims any assur-
ance as to whether they can get compensation, when it will be paid, or
how much it will be.
The reforms suggested by the Competitiveness Council and in
this Article are directed at fixing the process of resolving disputes, not
altering the substantive rights of any person to assert any meritorious
claim.55 They are nearly all procedural in nature. These proposals
are intended to open more doors for people to assert their rights by
clearing the way for truly meritorious claims to have their day in
court.
5 6
II. THE SOLUTIONS
Having noted the problems that are present in the existing civil
justice system, it is time to address the manner in which to deal with
the shortcomings. Solutions are available, and some general areas in
which reform should be considered are discussed below.
52. Id.; see a/soJon Cohen, Is Liability Slowing AIDS Vaccines?, SCIENCE, Apr. 10, 1992, at
168.
53. According to a study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), it takes the
average product liability suit more than two and a half years to go from complaint to ver-
dict and costs an average of $168,000. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY.
VERDICTS AND CASE RESOLUTION IN FVE STATES (Sept. 1989).
54. KIRKLAND & ELIS, supra note 1, at 14. The Commerce Department estimates that
only 40 cents from each dollar expended in product liability suits reaches the victim. Prod-
uct Liability in America: Damage Limitation, ECONOMIST, Dec. 2, 1989, at 84, 85. According to
some estimates, as much as 70% of the product liability awards are consumed in the litiga-
tion process. KIRKLAND & ELLIS, supra note 1, at 15. This represents an annual multi-
billion dollar transfer of wealth to the legal profession. Id.
55. Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 559, 560 (1992).
56. Id.
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A. Product Liability
Common-sense solutions are available to address the problems
presented by the product liability cases. It is my opinion that a uni-
form national system is the best way to solve all of these problems.
1. Federal Law.-National standards are essential to correcting
the flaws in the existing system. A uniform federal law, deriving from
the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution, should
replace the patchwork quilt of separate state laws. The operation of
fifty laws in as many states is expensive and has led only to confusion.
Tort law is fundamentally interstate in character, and thus the prob-
lem lends itself to a uniform national solution. On average, seventy
percent of the goods manufactured in one state are shipped out of
state and sold elsewhere.57 If the injury then occurs in a third state,
the issue can become further confused.5" Businesses and manufactur-
ers need the certainty and uniformity provided by a federal policy.59
A national law would not be contrary to the goal of systematically
returning authority to the states. Instead, it reflects the truly interstate
and international environment within which most competitive busi-
nesses operate today. A national law would help businesses to level
the playing field with their foreign counterparts.
a. A Statute of Repose.-Because product liability insurance
costs are markedly affected by the continued sale of older products,6"
such a national law should include a statute of repose. This provision
would set a time period beyond which lawsuits could not be brought
with respect to manufactured products and would create a uniform
limitations period, setting a time after discovery of a defect in which a
suit should be brought. An example of the problem is machine tools
built decades ago but still in use today.61 Built to the safety standards
of their day, typically by now each tool has passed through several
owners, each of whom has modified it to accommodate particular
needs.62 Product liability suits on this type of tool represent over one-
57. Hearing on H.R 10, supra note 4, at 1 (statement of Rep. HenryJ. Hyde).
58. Even the most pro-defendant law enacted by a state would have limited effect on in-
state companies because the law would help only if the manufacturer was sued in that state.
59. Hearing on H.R 10, supra note 4, at 48 (statement of Charles E. Gilbert, Jr., Presi-
dent, Cincinnati Gilbert Machine Tool Co.).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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half of the machine tool industry's lawsuits today.6" Foreign machine
tool builders do not face this long-term liability exposure and thus
have lower costs.64 A statute of repose would level the playing field in
international markets for U.S. manufacturers.63 Such a provision
would reduce industry members' product liability costs by sixty
percent.
66
A national law should also provide a defense if regulatory stan-
dards have been met in the design and manufacture of a product,67
and a defense if the product was manufactured in accordance with
state-of-the-art technology at the time of manufacture.68 A large in-
ventory of old products is currently in use and a prospective defend-
ant can do very little to minimize the loss from them.69 Furthermore,
many chemicals, drugs, and machine tools were originally sold years
ago when the dominant product liability law limited the exposure of
manufacturers and retailers. Tort reform must address the fact that
these products have outlived the legal regime under which they were
marketed." Finally, the law should provide that the wholesaler or re-
tailer should not be saddled with the same liability as manufacturers
unless some kind of individual negligence is established on its part.
b. Joint and Several Liability.-Another area of tort law in
need of reform is the concept of joint and several liability,7" and the
derivative "deep pockets" theory. Underjoint and several liability the-
63. Id. (citing ASSOCIATION FOR MFG. TECHNOLOGY, 20TH ANNUAL PRODUCr LIABiuTy
SURVEY 2 (1995)). While the manufacturers discussed in the testimony report that they
almost always prevail in these suits, the litigation is lengthy and costly. Id.
64. Id. at 52.
65. See id. The European Economic Community Product Directive has a statute of re-
pose of ten years. Id. at 100 (statement of PatrickJ. Head). Fifteen years was the recom-
mended interval in the House bill. Id.
66. Id. at 52 (statement of Charles E. Gilbert, Jr. (citing ASSOCIATION FOR MFG. TECH-
NOLOGY, supra note 63, at 1)).
67. Punitive damages should not be permitted in cases in which a product met strin-
gent regulatory and testing guidelines such as those mandated by the Federal Aviation
Administration and the Food and Drug Administration.
68. If a level of safety chosen is efficient, businesses should not have to act as insurers
simply because they have deep pockets. Viscusi & Moore, supra note 49, at 105, 124. If
insurance were the objective of the tort system without regard to some efficient level of
safety, then automakers would have to reimburse all victims of car accidents regardless of
causality. Id.
69. Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO
L. REv. 2193, 2218 (1989).
70. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive
Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 796 (1983).
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977) ("Each of two or more persons
whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible harm to the injured party
is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire harm.").
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ories, if more than one defendant is named, even if their liability var-
ies from one percent to ninety-five percent,72 all are held accountable
for the full 100 percent of the liability regardless of their degree of
contribution to the harm. 71 Under a theory ofjoint liability, a defend-
ant can be made to pay damages for injury caused by another party
acting totally independently.74 Sometimes the party most responsible
for the harm is not even a party to the action. That party may be
beyond the court's jurisdiction, may have already settled with the
plaintiff, or may be bankrupt and unable to pay an award.
The deep pockets theory makes little sense. 75 Although forty-one
states have abolished or limited this doctrine, 76 it enjoys wide applica-
tion under federal law.77 Apportionment of liability based on the in-
jury caused by a particular defendant is much more equitable. Under
the rule of individual liability, there would have to be a specific find-
ing of the degree of contribution to the harm. Liability would go be-
72. Twenty-five years ago, mostjuries were not permitted to return a verdict in favor of
a plaintiff if he was in any way responsible for his injuries. In contrast, in some states today,
a company found to be as little as 1% responsible for an accident may be held liable for
some of the damages. Amy D. Marcus, Plaintiffs Strike a Blow to Shift Blame for Accidents
Caused by Their Own Acts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1990, at BI.
73. See Walt Disney World v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 199, 202 (Fla. 1987) (holding,
under the doctrines ofjoint and several liability and comparative negligence, that the de-
fendant was liable for 86% of the damages though only responsible for 1% of the fault).
Rising liability costs have made producing airplanes unprofitable. What is most strik-
ing is that faulty airplane designs were not the source of liability burden. Even though
private error accounts for 85% of all accidents, the manufacturers of the aircraft are sued
in 90% of all crash cases. W. Kip Viscusi, A Principled Basis for Product Liability ReformJ. REG.
& Soc. COSTS (Nov. 1991). Two general aviation manufacturers slashed their output by
between 88% and 98% while their product liability costs rose from $24 million in 1977 to
$200 million in 1985. Stacy Shapiro, Tort Costs Hurt Aircraft Manufacturers, Bus. INs., June
10, 1991.
74. See Peter Van de Putte, A Red, White and Blue Mess, WALL ST.J., Apr. 27, 1995, atAl4
(discussing his flag company's liability for an individual's injury caused by a flag manufac-
tured and sold by another company).
75. But seeJohn H. Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages: Making the Inno-
cent Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REv. 458 (1923) (arguing for the relaxation of
rules that limit joint liability so that plaintiffs can have access to a broader range of
pockets).
76. See Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape: As Congress Struggles to Rewrite the Na-
tion's Tort Laws, the States Already May Have Done the Job, 81 AB.A. J. 56, 60 (Aug. 1995)
(citing data compiled by the American Tort Reform Association; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-21-111.5 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995).
77. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 270-71
(1979) (holding that no proportionate-fault rule exists in maritime law); United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that joint and several liability
exists under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168,180 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 independent actors may individually be held
liable for indivisible harm), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986).
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yond the degree of contribution only when insolvency of one
tortfeasor prevents recovery and the balance can be proportionately
shared.
2. Punitive Damages.-A main goal of a national tort reform law
would be to restrain runaway punitive damage awards.7" Punitive
damages, now almost routinely claimed in tort litigation,79 are consid-
ered punishment and not something to which plaintiffs have a right.80
Plaintiffs are entitled to be compensated for what they have lost, in-
cluding both economic and noneconomic losses. Today, the incen-
tive to file frivolous lawsuits is increased by the prospect of a sizable
punitive damage award."' Even trivial cases with nominal actual dam-
ages become difficult to resolve out of court because the plaintiff has
no incentive to settle merely for actual damages.8"
Limits must be placed on punitive damages to prevent the run-
away jury verdicts that have recently plagued our system.8 3 There is
little direct or statistical evidence that specific liability verdicts have
led to the development and introduction of substantially safer prod-
ucts.' Factors outside of the tort system, such as government regula-
tion and the reputational concern of producers and providers of
goods and services, have had a far greater impact on promoting
safety.8 5 The American College of Trial Lawyers and the American
Law Institute, two of the most prestigious groups in the legal profes-
sion, have recommended a limit on punitive damages that reflects
78. In 1987 the Institute for CivilJustice reported, after examining 24,000jury trials in
Cook County, Illinois, that the average punitive damage award increased, in inflation-ad-
justed dollars, from $43,000 to $729,999 for the periods 1965-69 to 1980-84. This is a real
increase of 1500%. The rise has been even greater in personal injury cases. See PRsi-
DENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETTvWENESS, supra note 1, at 6. In California, the average punitive
damages award increased from under $1 million in 1986 to $6.6 million in 1994. Janet
Novak, Torture by Court, FoRBEs, Nov. 6, 1995, at 138.
79. Hearing on H.R 10, supra note 4, at 64 (statement of Richard K. Willard). Mr.
Willard added, not totally facetiously, that it would "be almost malpractice for a plaintiff's
lawyer not to include such a claim." Id.
80. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform-State
Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. Rxv. 1365, 1368-70 (1993).
Furthermore, defendants in tort suits face the possibility of being punished repeatedly
by different plaintiffs seeking damages for what might have been the same transgression.
Middleton, supra note 76, at 61.
81. Hearing on H.R. 10, supra note 4, at 64 (statement of Richard K. Willard).
82. Id. Nor does the plaintiff's lawyer who is often working on a contingent fee basis.
83. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
84. THE BROOKINGS NEWS (The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.), June 13,
1991.
85. Id.
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some multiple of the amount of compensatory damages awarded. 6
Punitive awards would then be a mathematically derived number or a
predetermined sum, whichever is greater.8 7
Punitive damages are quasi-criminal in nature, intended to deter
particularly egregious conduct8 8 Therefore, the standard of conduct
for an award of punitive damages should be greater than negligence,
closer to intentionally malicious or, indeed, criminal conduct. The
burden of proof should provide for clear and convincing evidence of
the wrongdoing, not merely a preponderance of the evidence.
3. Eliminate Frivolous Lawsuits.-Finally, some inhibition must be
placed on the filing of frivolous lawsuits. In addition to limiting the
availability of excessive punitive damages, another way to limit frivo-
lous suits would be the adoption of some form of the "loser-pays" or
"English Rule."89 Account must be taken of the crushing burden that
is often imposed on individuals and businesses by the legal fees they
expend in defense of even groundless suits.9" Limitations should be
built in to ensure equal access to the courts and at the same time
encourage pretrial settlements by imposing a market restraint on the
litigation process.91
In addition, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must
be amended to provide even stiffer sanctions against attorneys who
86. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Haslip May Alter Tort Claim Strate-
gies, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 17, 1992, at 23.
87. The provisions pertaining to a cap on punitive damages in no way affect the
amount of economic damages that a plaintiff can receive. See generally Hearing on H.R. 10,
supra note 4, at 66 (statement of Richard K. Willard) (discussing the proposed punitive
damages cap in H.R. 10).
88. As the New York Court of Appeals stated:
[A]n award of damages to a person injured by the negligence of another is to
compensate the victim, not to punish the wrongdoer.... [T]he temptation to
achieve a balance between injury and damages has nothing to do with meaningful
compensation for the victim. Instead, the temptation is rooted in desire to pun-
ish the defendant... [and] has no place in the law of civil damages ....
McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374-75 (N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted).
89. The term "English Rule" is a misnomer-it is in fact the "everywhere but in
America rule." See Kenneth W. Starr, The Shifting Panorama of Attorneys' Fees Awards: The
Expansion of Fee Recoveries in Federal Court, 28 S. TEx. L. REv. 189, 189 (1986). The American
Rule is a "misfit" among most other nations' approaches to attorneys' fee awards. Id.
90. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. As one article noted:
There were at least 4 claims of $5 million filed in the Tylenol matter, and at least
one claim has already been filed against Sudafed. There is no negligence and no
blame in either case, and nothing the manufacturers could reasonably have done
to prevent the incidents. The only effect of such litigation is to raise the price
paid by consumers for over-the-counter medication.
Paul H. Rubin, Sudafed's the Last Thing to Be Afraid of WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1991, at A14.
91. PRESIDEWr's COUNCIL ON COMPETrrVENESS, supra note 1, at 9.
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file frivolous lawsuits.92 This would be a very effective way to curb law-
suit abuse.93
B. Medical Malpractice
Medical malpractice is the second major health care area that I
have identified as a concern. The model for reform proposals in the
Bush Administration was California's Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act (MICRA), 94 which has four very attractive features. First,
it controls the "lottery" aspect of medical liability while ensuring all
actual losses will be fully and adequately compensated.95 While pa-
tients can still recover 100% of their out-of-pocket expenses relating
to medical negligence, there is a $250,000 cap placed on
noneconomic damages.96 Second, MICRA contains a limitation on at-
torneys' fees, ensuring that patients, not their attorneys, will receive
the lion's share of any award.97 Third, it includes a provision requir-
ing the jury to be notified of any other source from which the plaintiff
has received recovery for economic losses, thereby preventing double
recovery.98 Finally, under MICRA, funds are provided for periodic
payments of future damages in excess of $50,000-representing either
income or medical treatment that may be required at some point in
the future.9 Under MICRA, physician malpractice payments have
gone from the highest in the world to one-third to one-half of those
paid by physicians in other states. 00
In response to the high added costs of defensive medicine, it
would be wise to consider a feature that exists in Maine, and that was
92. Many of the vital safeguards that Rule 11 once provided were stripped away by the
1993 revisions. Debra T. Ballen, Congress Off to a Good Start on Tort Reform, NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER, Feb. 20, 1995, at 150; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
93. See Ballen, supra note 92, at 15.
94. 1975 Cal. Stat. 3949. In 1975, facing the highest malpractice insurance premiums
in the world, the California legislature passed relief in the form of MICRA. Hatlie et al.,
supra note 37, at 52-53.
95. Hatlie et al., supra note 37, at 53. While in practice the MICRA limitations only
affect about 2% of the cases, the effect of screening out the lottery-type awards saves an
enormous amount of money. Id.
96. Id. The $250,000 ceiling is still much more than any other country in the world
allows. Id.
97. Id. Attorneys are encouraged to settle cases more quickly because they will not
benefit financially from lengthy litigation, and they cannot hope for a big lottery-type
award. Id. at 53-54.
98. Id. at 53. Such sources include workers' compensation, disability, and health insur-
ance. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 54. An obstetrician in California may pay $40,000 in annual premiums while
an obstetrician in Florida pays $152,000 and in New York pays $94,000. Id.
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included in President Clinton's original health care reform plan. This
feature allows physicians to defend medical malpractice liability claims
on the grounds that their professional conduct or treatment complied
with approved practice guidelines. The Maine Medical Liability Dem-
onstration Project 01 provides practice guidelines that specify recom-
mendations for treatment with regard to diagnoses and procedures." 2
The guidelines, when accompanied by corroborating expert testi-
mony, can be offered in court as evidence of acceptable care. 0 ' The
goal is to eliminate the need to litigate the standard of care.104
Maine officials expect the program to decrease physicians' moti-
vation to perform unnecessary diagnostic tests and treatment proce-
dures that lead to increased health care costs. 105 The majority of
eligible physicians in Maine have chosen to participate in the pro-
ject."' This program should reduce the number of in-court swearing
contests between experts that result from current procedures, and fo-
cus instead upon the best practices that are acknowledged within the
medical profession.
C. Reforming the Process
1. Case Management.-Streamlining and acceleration of litiga-
tion in both the federal and state courts are key to this aspect of re-
form. Over ninety percent of all lawsuits are settled. The real
question is, when do they settle? If they settle on the courthouse steps
just before the trial starts, the system has consumed an excessive
amount of time, labor, and resources to reach a result that could have
been accomplished much sooner.10 7 Reform measures could look to
the rigorous case-management techniques employed by judges in the
Eastern District of Virginia and their "rocket-docket" approach that
moves cases along at a very rapid rate and tolerates little delay.1 8
101. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-2979 (West Supp. 1995).
102. Id.; see also Rebecca R. Gschwend, Medical Specialty Societies and the Development of
Practice Policies, QUALrrv REV. BULL. (Feb. 1990).
103. See id.
104. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: MAINE'S USE OF PRAG
TICE GUIDELINES TO REDUCE COSTS, HRD-94-8 (Oct. 25, 1993).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Judges actually intervene in a large number of civil cases. In a 1980 nationwide
survey of trial judges, over 75% characterized their role as "interventionist" at settlement
conferences. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle". Judicial Promotion and Regula-
tion of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1342 (1994).
108. See Loren Lieve, Discovery Reform: Maybe the Best Solution Is No Discovery at All, 77
A.B.A.J. 79, 86 (1991).
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2. Discovery Reform.-Over eighty percent of the cost of an aver-
age civil lawsuit consists of pretrial investigation of facts through the
discovery process. °9 The life of the average civil lawsuit in federal
court is fourteen months." 0 In 1988 seventy-seven percent of liti-
gators surveyed admitted to having used discovery against their oppo-
nents as an economic weapon." 1
Pretrial depositions, interrogatories, and document demands can
consume considerable time and money. The cost of responding to
document demands can be astounding-employees must produce
documents, attorneys must review them, and then the documents
must all be copied and recorded." 2 Compelling an early exchange of
core documents'" 3 may enable us to cut down on the amount of time
that is spent "fencing" in pretrial maneuvers. Such early mandatory
dialogue would eliminate needless filings and delays in the exchange
of basic information and reduce both the gamesmanship and the
expense. '14
The 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
requiring prediscovery disclosure of relevant information without
waiting for a request from opposing counsel," 5 were a step in the
right direction. The new procedures have had little practical impact,
however, given that the rules allow district courts to opt out of the new
discovery provisions by local rule or court order, or to modify the re-
quirements." 6 So far, approximately half of the federal districts have
rejected or modified the mandatory disclosure rules." 7 This lack of
uniformity among federal districts has had unfortunate results, includ-
109. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 1, at 3.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Core materials include the names and addresses of people having knowledge likely
to bear on the claims and defenses, and the location of documents most relevant to the
case. Sanctions for failure to respond to such requests would result in the offending party
being barred from engaging in any further discovery. Id. at 16.
114. Id. at 17.
115. FED. P. Clv. P. 26(a)(1).
116. Id.; see also Leslie M. Kelleher, The December 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure-A Critical Analysis, 12 ToURo L. REv. 7, 87 (1995) (discussing the opt-out
provision).
117. See Ron Coleman, Skepticism Runs Rampant as the Federal Courts'Experiment with Dis-
covery Reform Hits the Two-Year Mark, 81 A.B.A. J. 76, 76 (Oct. 1995) (citing a study by the
Federal Judicial Center noting that 28 of 112 federal districts have rejected mandatory
disclosure, while 21 have modified the rule); Mark Hansen, Early Discovey Hits Snag: More
Than Half the Federal Courts Modify or Reject New Rule 80 A.B.AJ. 35, 35 (May 1994) (noting
some criticism of the Federal Judicial Center's tally).
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ing forum-shopping and satellite litigation.118 These rules should be
made uniform throughout the federal system, and similar efforts
should be adopted in state courts in order to make our civil justice
system more equitable and efficient.
As more than ninety percent of the civil lawsuits in this country
are settled or disposed of prior to trial, 19 mandatory settlement con-
ferences by judges after an initial exchange of information can also
move cases along. The goals would be to identify the areas of contro-
versy and to seek to resolve them at an earlier stage. This would ne-
cessitate earlier preparation by the parties, promote settlement, and
reduce transaction costs. The new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
encourage settlement by requiring parties in all cases to hold a pre-
trial discovery meeting to discuss the claims and defenses in the ac-
tion, develop a discovery plan, and explore the possibility of
settlement.1 20  In addition, alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
mechanisms should be encouraged, but not required. These include:
(1) early neutral evaluation; (2) mediation; (3) arbitration; and (4)
summary jury trials. 121
3. Remove Judges from Politics.-Finally, I want to suggest that all
states should undertake a maximum effort to remove judicial appoint-
ments from the partisan political process. Pennsylvania, for example,
is a major offender in this regard. Everyjudge, from the lowest magis-
trate to the highest justices of the supreme court, must run for elec-
tion on a partisan ballot. Voters have no idea for whom they are
voting or why. If they do, it is frequently for the wrong reason. A
process that takes the judiciary out of partisan politics would go as far
as any other single change towards effecting the kind of civil justice
reform discussed in this Article.
118. See Coleman, supra note 117, at 79 (noting that plaintiffs may consider discovery
rules in determining where to file);John C. Koski, Mandatory Disclosure: The New Rule That's
Meant to Simplify Litigation Could DoJust the Opposite, 80 A.BAJ., 85, 87 (Feb. 1994) (discuss-
ing the strain on the judicial system as parties litigate the parameters of the new rule).
119. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETrTIVENESS, supra note 1, at 7. While many litigants
believe the only channels to resolution are formal litigation and informal negotiation, I am
an enthusiast of, and I think more emphasis ought to be placed on, alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) mechanisms. ADR promotes the settling of disputes away from the
courts through contractual provisions or by consent of the parties.
120. FED. R, Crw. P. 26(f); see also Kelleher, supra note 116, at 89-92 (discussing the dis-
covery meeting in detail). Like Rule 26(a) (1), Rule 26(f) allows district courts to modify or
exempt themselves from this requirement, and several district courts have done so. See id.
at 91-92.
121. Id.
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If a system of elected judges must be maintained, then once
elected, the judges need to be subject to firm rules governing their
conduct on the bench. They in turn must lay down equally firm
guidelines for attorney discipline to deal with improper activities, in-
cluding the abuse of the discovery mechanisms mentioned above.
CONCLUSION
The first wave of change in tort reform was characterized by the
medical malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970s and the perception
that tort laws favor plaintiffs.122 A decade later, the second wave fo-
cused on product liability and resulted in most states tightening their
rules on joint and several liability. 25 The third and current wave of
change is upon us. It features debate over the erosion of American
competitiveness, the use of the threat of litigation as a weapon, joint
and several liability, "loser-pays" rules, and congressional, as opposed
to state, action.
1 2 4
The House and Senate took the first steps toward meaningful re-
form of our civil justice system this year by passing products liability
legislation. 125 President Clinton's veto, however, frustrated the com-
pletion of the reform process for now. 126 Despite this setback, the
measure's success in Congress indicates that real progress is possible
in the future.
The real issues are not political but relate to a lagging American
global competitiveness and a liability system that, at best, makes margi-
nal contributions to product safety and national well-being. 127 Re-
form is urgently needed to reflect America's continuing commitment
to justice, innovation, and the continuing improvement of American
employment and living standards for generations to come.
1 28
American lawyers could well heed the admonition of Abraham
Lincoln, a crafty and experienced litigator himself, who advised: "Dis-
courage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever
you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real
loser-in fees, expenses and waste of time."1 29
122. Middleton, supra note 76, at 57.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. John F. Harris, Clinton Vetoes Product Liability Measure; Move Triggers Barrage ofAccusa-
tions Between White Howe and Hill Republicans, WASH. PoSr, May 3, 1996, at A14.
126. Id.
127. KIRKLAND & ELus, supra note 1, at 30-33.
128. Id.
129. Abraham Lincoln, Notesfor a Law Lecture (July 1, 1850), in THE LIFE AND WITINGS OF
ABRAHAm LINCOLN 329 (Philip Van Doren Stem ed., 1991).
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In truth, the real loser from a failure to reform our costly tort
laws may be American working men and women. Our lessened ability
to compete in world markets and slower economic growth at home
will generate fewer high-quality jobs and will result in a decreased
standard of living. Defending a system that promotes such a result
does no favor to this country or its citizenry.
